Chernobyl disaster

Date

On April 26, 1986, reactor number 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, located near Pripyat, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union (later Ukraine), exploded. The disaster caused many immediate deaths and thousands of health problems. It is one of only two nuclear accidents rated as the highest level of severity on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the other being the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident.

On April 26, 1986, reactor number 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, located near Pripyat, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union (later Ukraine), exploded. The disaster caused many immediate deaths and thousands of health problems. It is one of only two nuclear accidents rated as the highest level of severity on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the other being the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. The response included more than 500,000 workers and cost about 18 billion rubles (approximately 84.5 billion US dollars in 2025). It remains the worst nuclear disaster and the most expensive disaster in history, with an estimated cost of 700 billion US dollars.

The disaster happened during a test to check how the reactor would cool during a power outage. The operators continued the test even though the reactor’s power had dropped accidentally. A problem with the reactor’s design caused a sudden increase in power. The reactor’s parts broke, and the coolant leaked, leading to steam explosions and a meltdown that destroyed the reactor building. This was followed by a fire in the reactor core, which spread radioactive material across the Soviet Union and Europe. A 10 km exclusion zone was set up 36 hours after the accident, first moving about 49,000 people. Later, the exclusion zone expanded to 30 km, moving an additional 68,000 people.

After the explosion, which killed two engineers and seriously injured two others, workers began emergency efforts to control the fires and stabilize the reactor. Of the 237 workers hospitalized, 134 had symptoms of acute radiation syndrome (ARS); 28 of them died within three months. Over the next decade, 14 more workers (nine with ARS) died from causes mostly unrelated to radiation. This is the only known case in commercial nuclear power history where radiation-related deaths occurred. By 2005, about 6,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer were reported among affected people (15 of which were fatal), with many linked to the disaster. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation estimates fewer than 100 deaths resulted from the fallout. Predictions about the total number of deaths vary; a 2006 World Health Organization study estimated 9,000 cancer-related deaths in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

Pripyat was abandoned and replaced by the city of Slavutych, built specifically for this purpose. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant sarcophagus, completed in December 1986, helped reduce the spread of radioactive material and protected workers at the undamaged reactors. Between 2016 and 2018, the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement was built around the old sarcophagus to allow the removal of reactor debris. Cleanup is expected to finish by 2065.

Accident sequence

In nuclear reactors, most heat comes from nuclear fission, but more than 6% is produced by radioactive decay, which continues even after the reactor stops. Keeping coolant moving is essential to stop the reactor core from overheating or melting. RBMK reactors, like those at Chernobyl, use water as a coolant, moved by electric pumps. Reactor number 4 had 1,661 fuel channels, needing over 45 million liters of coolant every hour.

If all power is lost, each Chernobyl reactor had three backup diesel generators. These took 60–75 seconds to start and provide 5.5 MW of power to run one main pump. Special weights on the pumps helped move coolant using inertia until the generators started. However, if a power failure and a coolant pipe break happened at the same time, the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) would be needed to add water to the core.

Scientists thought the steam turbine’s energy could be used to power the ECCS through feedwater pumps. As the turbine slowed, it might still provide enough energy to run coolant pumps for 45 seconds. This would not fully replace backup generators but could help reduce the problem.

Testing this idea had failed in earlier attempts. In 1982, the turbine’s voltage was too low. After changes, tests in 1984 and 1985 also failed due to equipment issues. A new test was planned for 1986 during a reactor shutdown for maintenance.

The test plan included:
1. Lowering the reactor’s power to between 700 and 1,000 MW (to allow cooling while the turbine ran without power).
2. Running the steam turbine at normal speed.
3. Using four main pumps with off-site power and four with turbine power.
4. Shutting off steam to the turbine, which would normally trigger a reactor shutdown.
5. Measuring the turbine’s voltage and the pumps’ speed.
6. Letting the turbine continue spinning freely once backup generators started.

The test was scheduled for April 25, 1986, during a planned shutdown. Engineers were trained to follow the plan, and a team of electrical experts was present. Power was gradually reduced to 50% of the reactor’s normal level by the start of the day shift.

The test was planned for 2:15 PM, but delays occurred. A nearby power plant went offline, and the Kiev grid controller asked Chernobyl to delay power reduction to meet evening demand. The day shift was replaced by the evening shift, and the emergency cooling system remained disabled. This required workers to manually turn large valves for hours, showing a lack of safety precautions.

At 11:04 PM, the grid controller allowed the shutdown to continue. The day and evening shifts had left, and the night shift would not take over until midnight. The test was supposed to finish during the day shift, leaving the night shift only to manage cooling systems in a shutdown reactor.

Anatoly Dyatlov, a senior engineer, oversaw the test. Aleksandr Akimov led the night shift, and Leonid Toptunov, a young engineer, managed reactor control. The test aimed to lower power to 700–1,000 MW, but reactor power dropped further due to xenon-135, a neutron-absorbing substance created by fission. This made control harder but was predictable during power reductions.

When power reached about 500 MW, control was switched to automatic regulators. One regulator removed control rods, but another failed. Toptunov reduced power to fix the issue, causing a sudden drop to near shutdown. The exact cause of the drop is unclear, though some blame Toptunov’s actions, while Dyatlov said it was due to a fault.

Crisis management

The nearby city of Pripyat was not evacuated right away, and the people there were not warned during the night about the accident. Within a few hours, many people became sick. Later, they reported severe headaches, a metallic taste in their mouths, and uncontrollable coughing and vomiting. Since the nuclear plant was managed by officials in Moscow, the Ukrainian government did not receive quick information about the accident.

Valentyna Shevchenko, then Chairwoman of the Presidium of Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, said that Ukraine's acting Minister of Internal Affairs, Vasyl Durdynets, called her at work at 09:00 to report current affairs. Only at the end of the call did he mention that there had been a fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, adding that it was extinguished and everything was fine. When Shevchenko asked, "How are the people?" he replied that there was nothing to worry about: "Some are celebrating a wedding, others are gardening, and others are fishing in the Pripyat River."

Shevchenko then spoke by telephone to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and acting head of state, who said he expected a delegation from a state commission led by Boris Shcherbina, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A commission was formed later that day to investigate the accident. It was led by Valery Legasov, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and included nuclear expert Evgeny Velikhov, hydro-meteorologist Yuri Izrael, radiologist Leonid Ilyin, and others. They flew to Boryspil International Airport and arrived at the power plant in the evening of 26 April. By that time, two people had already died and 52 were hospitalized. The delegation soon found strong evidence that the reactor was destroyed and that extremely high radiation levels had caused many cases of radiation exposure. In the early hours of 27 April, they ordered the evacuation of Pripyat.

A translated excerpt of the evacuation announcement follows:

To speed up the evacuation, residents were told to take only what they needed and that they would remain evacuated for about three days. As a result, most personal belongings were left behind, and residents were only allowed to recover certain items after months had passed. By 15:00, 53,000 people were evacuated to the Kiev region. The next day, talks began about evacuating people from the 10 km zone. Ten days after the accident, the evacuation area was expanded to 30 km. The Chernobyl exclusion zone has remained ever since, although its shape and size have changed.

The surveying and detection of isolated radiation hotspots outside this zone over the following year eventually resulted in 135,000 long-term evacuees in total. Between 1986 and 2000, the number of permanently resettled people from the most contaminated areas nearly tripled to about 350,000. A new city, Slavutych, was built across the Dnieper marshes to house Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant employees instead of Pripyat, with a direct rail connection to the Chernobyl NPP.

Evacuation began one and a half days before the Soviet Union publicly acknowledged the accident. On the morning of 28 April, radiation levels triggered alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden, over 1,000 km from the Chernobyl Plant. Workers at Forsmark reported the case to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, which determined the radiation had come from another location. That day, the Swedish government contacted the Soviet government to ask if there had been a nuclear accident in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities first denied it. Only after the Swedish government suggested filing an official alert with the International Atomic Energy Agency did the Soviet government admit an accident had occurred at Chernobyl.

At first, the authorities claimed only a minor accident had happened, but once they evacuated more than 100,000 people, the scale of the situation became widely known. At 21:02 on the evening of 28 April, a 20-second announcement was read on the TV news program Vremya: "There has been an accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. One of the nuclear reactors was damaged. The effects of the accident are being remedied. Assistance has been provided for any affected people. An investigative commission has been set up."

This was the first time the Soviet Union officially announced a nuclear accident. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) then discussed the Three Mile Island accident and other American nuclear accidents, which The New York Times reported was an example of a common Soviet tactic of deflecting attention. The mention of a commission also showed the seriousness of the incident, and subsequent state radio broadcasts were replaced with classical music, a common method of preparing the public for a tragic announcement in the USSR.

Around the same time, ABC News released a report about the disaster. Shevchenko was the first Ukrainian state official to arrive at the disaster site on 28 April. She returned home near midnight, stopping at a radiological checkpoint in Vilcha, one of the first checkpoints set up after the accident.

A message from Moscow said there was no reason to delay the 1 May International Workers' Day celebrations in Kiev. On 30 April, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU discussed the plan for the celebration. Scientists reported that radiation levels in Kiev were normal. It was decided to shorten the celebration from the usual three and a half to four hours to under two hours.

Several buildings in Pripyat remained open for workers still involved with the plant. These included the Jupiter factory and the Azure Swimming Pool, used by Chernobyl liquidators for recreation during the cleanup.

Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir for emergency cooling pumps and as a pressure suppression system to condense steam from a broken pipe. The third floor above them, below the reactor, served as a steam tunnel. Steam from a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into the pools to bubble through a layer of water.

The smoldering steel, fuel, serpentinite, and other materials, at more than 1,200°C (2,190°F), pooled on the floor of the sub-reactor space, creating corium, a radioactive semi-liquid material similar to lava. Officials feared that if this mixture traveled through the pipes into the water pool, it could cause more contamination or another explosion, so they considered draining the pool. These fears proved unnecessary, as corium dripped harmlessly into the flooded bubbler pools before the water could be removed. The molten fuel hit the water and

Site remediation

Okay, I need to rewrite the given text at a 6th-grade reading level. Let me start by understanding the original content. The text is about the Chernobyl disaster, the subsequent management of the site, the construction of the New Safe Confinement, and the ongoing issues with radioactive materials.

First, I should simplify complex vocabulary. Words like "sarcophagus" might be too advanced. Maybe "concrete cover" instead. Also, technical terms like "neutron moderator" need to be explained in simpler terms. I need to ensure that the sentences are short and the structure is clear.

Next, I have to maintain the formal and educational tone. That means avoiding contractions and using precise language. However, I must not add any opinions or information not present in the original text. I need to check each paragraph to ensure all factual content is included without any embellishment.

Looking at the original text, there are several dates and events. I need to present these in a way that's easy for a 6th grader to understand. For example, "In October 1991, a fire occurred…" can be rephrased as "In October 1991, a fire happened in the turbine building of reactor no. 2."

I should also break down complex sentences. For instance, the part about the New Safe Confinement (NSC) being a metal arch. I can describe it as "a large metal structure that is 105 meters high and 257 meters long."

I need to ensure that all technical terms are either simplified or explained. Terms like "corium" might be replaced with "radioactive material that hardened into a ceramic form." Also, terms like "half-life" should be explained in simple terms, such as "the time it takes for half of the radioactive material to lose its strength."

I must check that all the key points are covered: the shutdown of reactors, the construction of the sarcophagus and NSC, the issues with the NSC after the drone strike, the storage of used fuel, the ISF-1 and ISF-2 facilities, the radioactive materials, the Exclusion Zone, and the estimates for habitability.

I should avoid using passive voice where possible to make the sentences more direct. For example, instead of "It was assumed that this was due to the weight of snow," use "Experts thought the snow's weight caused the collapse."

Also, ensure that numbers are presented clearly. For example, "600 square metre section" becomes "a section of the roof that was 600 square meters."

I need to maintain the chronological order of events as presented in the original text. Each paragraph should flow logically, covering one topic at a time without jumping around.

Finally, I'll review the rewritten text to ensure it's at the correct reading level, free of complex vocabulary, and accurately reflects all the factual information from the original without adding any opinions or extra details.
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After the disaster, questions were raised about what would happen to the plant and the damaged reactor. Work on the unfinished reactors, number 5 and number 6, stopped three years later. The damaged reactor was sealed, and 200 cubic meters of concrete were placed between the disaster site and the working buildings. The Ukrainian government allowed the other three reactors to stay open because the country needed more energy.

In October 1991, a fire happened in the turbine building of reactor number 2. Officials said the reactor was too damaged to fix and shut it down. Reactor number 1 was closed in November 1996 as part of an agreement between the Ukrainian government and international groups like the IAEA to stop operations at the plant. On December 15, 2000, President Leonid Kuchma turned off reactor number 3 in a ceremony, ending all activity at the site.

The concrete cover built after the accident was not meant to last long, only about 30 years. In February 2013, a 600 square meter section of the turbine building’s roof collapsed near the cover, causing more radioactivity to be released. At first, experts thought the snow’s weight caused the collapse, but a Ukrainian team later said the problem was poor repairs and the structure aging. Experts warned the cover itself was close to falling apart.

In 1997, the international Chernobyl Shelter Fund was created to build a stronger cover for the unstable structure. It received €864 million from international donors in 2011 and was managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The new cover, called the New Safe Confinement (NSC), started construction in 2010. It was a large metal arch, 105 meters high and 257 meters long, built on rails next to reactor number 4 so it could slide over the old cover. The NSC was finished in 2016 and placed over the old cover on November 29.

In February 2025, a Russian drone hit the NSC, causing a fire and damaging the outer and inner layers of the shelter. In December 2025, the IAEA said the drone strike made the structure unable to perform its main safety job. The IAEA Director General said a mission found the structure’s main safety functions, like containing radiation, were lost, but the structure itself and its monitoring systems were not permanently damaged.

Used fuel from reactors 1–3 was stored in cooling ponds and in a temporary facility called ISF-1, which now holds most of the spent fuel from these reactors. This allowed the reactors to be shut down safely. About 50 fuel pieces from reactors 1 and 2 were damaged and needed special handling. Fuel was moved to ISF-1 in three steps: first from reactor 3, then undamaged fuel from reactors 1 and 2, and finally the damaged fuel. All fuel transfers to ISF-1 were completed in June 2016.

A need was recognized for better long-term storage of radioactive waste. A new facility, ISF-2, was designed to store used fuel and other waste. A contract was signed in 1999 with Areva NP (Framatome) to build ISF-2. By 2003, problems with the design were found, and Areva left the project. Holtec International was hired to build a new version of ISF-2. The new design was approved in 2010, construction began in 2011, and the facility was finished in August 2017.

ISF-2 is the largest nuclear fuel storage facility in the world, expected to hold over 21,000 fuel pieces for at least 100 years. The project includes a processing area that cuts fuel pieces and places them in canisters filled with inert gas and sealed. These canisters are then stored in dry vaults for up to 100 years. The facility can process 2,500 fuel pieces each year.

Radioactive material includes pieces of the reactor core, dust, and lava-like materials that hardened into a ceramic form. Three types of lava are found in the basement of the reactor building: black, brown, and a porous ceramic. The lava is made of silicate glass with other materials inside. The porous lava is brown and cooled quickly when it hit water. Scientists are unsure how long the ceramic form will stop radioactivity from escaping. Between 1997 and 2002, studies suggested the lava might turn into a fine powder quickly due to radiation. However, later studies said the process is slow, and uranium from the reactor is only lost at a rate of 10 kg per year. This suggests the lava is resisting its environment. When the shelter is improved, the rate of uranium loss may decrease. By 2021, some fuel had already broken down significantly. A piece of the fuel, called the "elephant's foot," once so hard it needed a special bullet to break, had softened to the texture of sand.

Before the NSC was completed, rainwater acted as a neutron moderator, increasing fission in the remaining materials and risking a dangerous reaction. Gadolinium nitrate solution was used to reduce neutron activity. Even after the NSC was built, fission reactions may have increased. Neutron activity dropped in most areas, but from 2017 to late 2020, neutron density doubled in the space below the reactor before stabilizing in early 2021. This increase suggested more fission was happening as water levels dropped, which was unexpected. Scientists worry this could lead to a self-sustaining reaction, spreading more radioactive material and making cleanup harder. Possible solutions include using a robot to insert boron carbide control rods into the fuel. In early 2021, a press release said neutron activity had stabilized.

The Exclusion Zone was originally a 30 km radius around the plant but was later expanded to cover about 2,600 square kilometers, called the "zone of alienation." The area has mostly become forest and is now home to many animals because there are no people to compete for resources.

Media reports have given rough estimates for when the area might be safe again. These guesses range from 300 years to many thousands of years, based on the half-life of Plutonium-239, which is found in the center of the zone.

After the disaster, some residents, called

Long-term effects

The Chernobyl accident released about 400 times more radioactive material than the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, it released only about one-hundredth to one-thousandth of the total radioactivity from nuclear weapons testing during the Cold War. This difference is due to the types of radioactive materials involved.

About 100,000 square kilometers of land became significantly contaminated, with the most affected areas in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Lower levels of contamination were found across Europe, except in the Iberian Peninsula. On April 28, workers at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, 1,100 kilometers from Chernobyl, were found with radioactive particles on their clothing. Sweden’s increased radiation levels on April 28 were traced to the western Soviet Union. In Finland, rising radiation levels were detected on April 27, but a civil service strike delayed the response.

Radioactive material spread unevenly, depending on weather conditions. Much of it settled in mountainous regions, such as the Alps, Welsh mountains, and Scottish Highlands, where cooling caused radioactive rainfall. Contamination was often highly localized, with water flows creating large variations in radiation levels over small areas. Sweden and Norway experienced heavy fallout when contaminated air met a cold front, bringing rain. Groundwater also became contaminated.

To reduce contamination, the Soviet Air Force seeded rain over 10,000 square kilometers of Belarus, causing heavy black rain in Gomel. Scientists estimate Belarus received about 60% of the contamination in the former Soviet Union. However, a 2006 report noted that up to half of the radioactive particles landed outside the current borders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Parts of Russia and Ukraine also became contaminated. Studies suggest over one million people may have been affected by radiation. By 2016, radiation exposure in parts of Belarus near Gomel had decreased.

In Western Europe, food imports were restricted due to radiation concerns. A 2006 study found contamination was "relatively limited," decreasing from west to east. For example, a person eating 40 kilograms of contaminated wild boar in 1997 would receive about one millisievert of radiation.

The Chernobyl disaster released radioactive materials with specific physical and chemical properties. Highly radioactive fission products, such as iodine, caesium, and strontium, were especially dangerous because they accumulate in the food chain. Iodine-131 and caesium-137 were the main sources of radiation exposure for the general population.

Different isotopes caused most of the radiation exposure at different times after the accident. After seven half-lives, the activity of a radioactive substance is less than 1% of its original level. This continues to decrease over time. Some radionuclides produce other radioactive decay products, but this is not discussed here. The release of radioactive materials was influenced by their boiling points, with much of the radioactivity remaining in the reactor.

  • All noble gases, such as krypton and xenon, were released immediately after the first steam explosion. Xenon-133, with a half-life of 5 days, was released in an estimated 5,200 petabecquerels.
  • About 50–60% of the reactor’s radioiodine, or 1,760 petabecquerels (about 400 grams), was released as vapor, solid particles, or organic compounds. Iodine-131 has a half-life of 8 days.
  • About 20–40% of caesium-137, or 85 petabecquerels, was released in aerosol form. Caesium-137 and strontium isotopes are the main reasons the Chernobyl exclusion zone remains uninhabitable. Cs-137 has a half-life of 30 years.
  • Tellurium-132, with a half-life of 78 hours, was released in an estimated 1,150 petabecquerels.
  • An early estimate suggested 3% of nuclear fuel was released, later revised to 3.5%. This equals about 6 tonnes of fragmented fuel.

The Chernobyl plant is near the Pripyat River, which flows into the Dnieper reservoir system. At the time, this system supplied water to 2.4 million people in Kiev and was still in spring flood. Radioactive contamination of water became a major issue after the accident.

In Ukraine, radioactivity levels in drinking water raised concerns in the weeks and months after the disaster. Guidelines for radioiodine in drinking water were temporarily raised to 3,700 becquerels per liter. Officials claimed all contaminants settled in an insoluble form and would not dissolve for 800–1,000 years. A year later, water from the plant’s cooling pond was within safe limits. However, Kiev’s water supply was switched to the Desna River two months after the disaster. Silt traps and a 30-meter underground barrier were built to prevent groundwater from the damaged reactor from entering the Pripyat River.

Groundwater was not heavily affected because short-lived radionuclides decayed quickly, and longer-lived ones like caesium and strontium were absorbed by soil before reaching groundwater. However, waste disposal sites in the 30-kilometer exclusion zone around Chernobyl have released radionuclides into groundwater. The IAEA Chernobyl Report states these transfers are not significant compared to surface contamination.

Radioactivity in fish reached levels much higher than allowed limits. In the European Union, radiocaesium in fish should not exceed about 1,000 becquerels per kilogram. In Ukraine’s Kiev Reservoir, fish had levels up to 3,000 becquerels per kilogram early after the disaster. In Belarus and Russia, some fish had levels from 100 to 60,000 becquerels per kilogram between 1990 and 1992. This caused short-term concerns in the UK and Germany and long-term issues in Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Scandinavia.

Significance

Because many people in the First World did not trust the Soviet leaders, who hid information about the disaster, there was much discussion about the event in the early days. Journalists did not trust some professionals, and this made the public doubt them too.

The accident increased already high concerns about nuclear reactors worldwide. Most worries focused on reactors with the same unusual design, but many other nuclear reactor plans, including those being built at Chernobyl (reactors 5 and 6), were eventually stopped. Rising costs from new safety rules and the challenges of dealing with public fear led to a sharp drop in the number of new reactors built after 1986.

The disaster also highlighted unsafe practices in the Soviet nuclear industry, slowing its growth and pushing the Soviet government to share more information about its operations. The Soviet government’s cover-up of the Chernobyl disaster helped start a movement called glasnost, which "made way for changes that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse." Problems with the design and construction of the power plant, as well as poor safety practices, had been known to the KGB since at least 1973 and reported to the Central Committee, which did nothing and kept the information secret.

In Italy, the political effects of the Chernobyl disaster influenced the outcome of the 1987 nuclear power referendum. Italy began to stop using its nuclear power plants in 1988, a decision changed in 2008. A 2011 referendum again showed Italian people’s opposition to nuclear power, canceling the 2008 decision.

In Germany, the Chernobyl disaster led to the creation of a federal environment ministry. The German environmental minister was given responsibility for reactor safety, a role still held today. The disaster also helped grow the anti-nuclear movement in Germany, leading to the decision to stop using nuclear power by the 1998–2005 Schröder government. A temporary change to this policy ended with the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

In response to the Chernobyl disaster, the International Atomic Energy Agency held a conference in 1986 to create a treaty called the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. This treaty requires members to inform others about nuclear or radiation accidents that could affect other countries. Another treaty, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, was also created.

The Chernobyl disaster has been studied to understand why such accidents happen, including issues like lack of sleep and poor management.

The State Archives of Ukraine have a collection of about 1,000 declassified documents about the power station, the disaster, and its effects up to the early 2000s. This archive was added by UNESCO to its Memory of the World International Register in 2017, recognizing it as important global heritage.

The Chernobyl disaster has inspired many artists worldwide to create works about the event. These include the HBO series Chernobyl and the book Voices from Chernobyl by Svetlana Alexievich. The Ukrainian artist Roman Gumanyuk made a series of 30 oil paintings called "Pripyat Lights, or Chernobyl Shadows," displayed from 2012 to 2013.

The video game S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Shadows of Chernobyl, made by GSC Game World and released in 2007, is a first-person shooter set in the Exclusion Zone. A prequel, S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Clear Sky, was released in 2008, followed by a sequel, S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Call of Pripyat, in 2010. The horror film Chernobyl Diaries, released in 2012, follows six tourists who visit the abandoned city of Pripyat and discover they are not alone.

Filmmakers have made documentaries about the disaster’s aftermath. The Oscar-winning film Chernobyl Heart (2003) shows how radiation affected people in the area and the long-term effects of radiation. The documentary Babushkas of Chernobyl (2015) follows three elderly women who returned to the Exclusion Zone after the disaster. The Battle of Chernobyl (2006) includes rare footage from the day before the disaster and explains the events leading to the explosion of reactor 4 and the response. The 2019 TV series Chernobyl focuses on the disaster and the cleanup efforts that followed.

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